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Authorizing Copyright Infringement and the Control
Requirement: A Look at P2P File-Sharing and
Distribution of New Technology in the U.K., Australia,
Canada, and Singapore 
Jeffrey C.J. Lee†
Abstract 
he doctrine of authorizing copyright infringement has been used to deal with the marketing of newT technology that might be employed by a user to infringe copyright, from the distribution of blank cassette
tapes and double-cassette tape recorders to photocopiers. It is being tested yet again with the distribution of peer-
to-peer file-sharing software that enables the online exchange of MP3 music and other copyrighted files. This
article looks at the different positions adopted in several Commonwealth jurisdictions, and examines the policy
considerations behind these positions. It looks at, in particular, the recent Australian case of Universal Music
Australia Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. While many copyright infringement issues involve a bal-
ancing of the copyright owner’s interests against the alleged infringing user’s interests, the authorization concept is
compounded by the further competing interests of promoting technology, as well as the interests of legitimate
users who deploy the technology in lawful ways. The court’s challenge is to find an acceptable equilibrium among
these interests.
Introduction The Issue 
he key issue raised by P2P file-sharing cases is thes the reality and impact of peer-to-peer file-sharing T liability of the software provider who makes freelyA has become more apparent over the last two years,
available to users software that is used to enable thethe music industry continues to grapple with the
transfer of files, usually copyrighted music files.blessing and the evil of this technology. This technology
In the U.K., Australia, Canada, and Singapore,allows music and other files to be easily transmitted with
‘‘authorization’’ of copyright infringement is the doctrinea click of the button through the Internet. It opens up a
applied to secondary infringement; for instance, thenew audience who hitherto may not have had access to
supply of a device or technology that may be used toonline materials, and thus it represents new business
make illegal copies directly. The distributor does notpotential. Yet, the ease with which copyrighted material
personally make the copies; the person to whom themay be copied and transmitted illegally means that a
device or technology is supplied does. The users, in cop-new audience may not always translate into immediate
ying and exchanging copyrighted material, are clearlycorresponding economic returns.
primary infringers. Would the distributor be indirectlyIn July 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court case of MGM
liable for such copyright infringement by such users?Studios v. Grokster Ltd. (‘‘Grokster’’) 1 strove to achieve a
fair balance between the interests of the music industry This article begins with a look at the technology
and the need to encourage innovation, as well as the involved in P2P file-sharing. Grokster and Sharman are
public interest of having access to information. The Aus- then examined in brief. The concept of authorization
tralian Federal Court case of Universal Music Australia (which applies in Australia, the U.K., and Singapore) by a
Pty Ltd. v. Sharman License Holdings Ltd. (‘‘Sharman’’) 2 person of copyright infringement by another person is
followed soon after, dealing with almost identical tech- reviewed. The various jurisdictions have crafted different
nology and similar issues as those in Grokster. scopes of this doctrine. In particular, Sharman’s approach
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to authorization and its effect on P2P transactions are the requesting user who may download the file accord-
examined. Other possible bases of liability, such as incite- ingly. In the decentralized and the intermediate systems,
ment of infringement and joint tortfeasors, are also con- users of the software products continue sharing files with
sidered. Based on the varying interpretations of authori- little or no interruption. This is so even if the central
zation in the respective jurisdictions, it is submitted that server is shut down.
the Grokster and Sharman scenarios do not always result
in liability for the distributor in these different jurisdic-
tions. The Decision from U.S. Supreme
Court 
rokster Ltd. and StreamCast Networks Inc. pro-The P2P Technology G vided free software products for use in a supernode
he P2P system comprises a network through which P2P network model. 4T file exchanges occur. Key components of the system Users who copied and exchanged copyrightedinclude a file index, where files are identified by names music files were clearly liable for primary copyrightcreated by users who contribute the files for sharing. A infringement. As the users were numerous, the musicsearch facility allows the user to enter a search term or industry sued the suppliers of the copying enabling tech-terms for the song title (in the case of music files). On nology for contributory infringement to the primaryrequest, the person who has contributed and stored the copyright violation and for vicarious liability.song in his or her own server passes the music file to the
Under U.S. common law, there is contributoryrequesting party. There are different versions of the file-
infringement when a material contribution is made tosharing system.
an infringing activity and the alleged secondary infringer
knows of such infringing activity at the time of material1. Centralized System 
contribution. 5Here, the software distributor may provide the
For products capable of substantial non-infringingsearch engine and servers and maintain on its server an
uses, the Sony doctrine (‘‘Sony’’) 6 applies to bar secon-index of the available file names of online users. File
dary liability based on ‘‘presuming or imputing intent toexchange depends on the software provider maintaining
cause infringement solely from the design or distributionits server, as all exchanges go through the server. This was
of a product capable of substantial lawful uses, which thethe system used by the now defunct Napster Inc. in
distributor knows is in fact used for infringement’’. 7A&M Records v. Napster. 3
Without effective control by the distributor over the
2. Decentralized System manner of use of the P2P software, the District Court8
and Ninth Circuit9 found there was no liability in con-At the other end of the spectrum is the completely
tributory infringement arising from primary copyrightdecentralized system. Searching, file transferring, and
infringement by users exchanging copyrighted musiclocating other users are performed without the help of
files. The P2P software was regarded as capable of sub-the software provider, its server, or the establishment of
stantial non-infringing uses (for instance, the sharing ofany intermediaries.
public domain materials and licensed music files). The
Sony defence thus absolved the defendant.3. Intermediate System 
Based on Sony, there was no requisite intent toThis was the model used in both Sharman and
cause infringement at the time of distribution of theGrokster (also known as the supernode or distributed
software. At the point of actual primary infringement bysystem). Here, selected users’ computers on the network
users, the distributors no longer had control over the useare designated as supernodes or indexing servers — the
of the software and could not be said to contribute topurpose being to keep an index of available files. Actual
infringement by providing the ‘‘site and facilities’’ 10 forfiles, in common with the other systems, are kept in the
direct infringement.respective users’ computers.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court propounded anSome centralized functions are the supply of the
inducement theory of infringement that attaches liabilitysoftware and a central server for keeping user registra-
as follows: a person who ‘‘distributes a device with thetions and logging users into the system. Decentralized
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, asfeatures are the file indexing and the independence of
shown by clear expression or affirmative steps taken tothe users (once they have located each other) in
foster infringement, is liable for the resulting acts ofexchanging files without going through the central
infringement of third parties’’. 11server. The supernode receives a user’s request and
searches its own index of available files kept on other All relevant circumstances are considered in evalu-
users’ computers. The supernode may communicate ating whether an unlawful object exists, including
with other supernodes to check for available files. The whether the alleged infringer12 (a) showed itself to be
receiving supernode then communicates these results to aiming to satisfy a known source of demand for copy-
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right infringement; (b) attempted to develop filtering were alleged to exercise control over the Kazaa network
tools or other mechanisms to diminish the infringing operations and its file-sharing policies.
activity using the software or technology in question; Were Sharman, Alnet, and the other respondents
and (c) makes money by selling advertising space, by liable under the Copyright Act (Australia) 16 for authori-
directing ads to the screens of computers using their zation of infringement by users who exchanged copy-
software. righted files without the copyright owner’s consent?
The Supreme Court accepted the Sony doctrine as Notably, the Australian Copyright Act, section 112E,
good law — but was of the view that the doctrine did states that a person who provides facilities for making, or
not protect a party who had engaged in the inducing of facilitating the making of, a communication is not
copyright infringement. 13 treated as having authorized any copyright infringement
On the facts, the distributor was found to have in an audio-visual item simply because another person
engaged in the following conduct: uses the facilities to infringe copyright. 17
(a) blatant advertising of its services to attract The Australian Federal Court held that section 112E
unlawful exchanges, particularly of former Nap- does not protect a person where, for reasons other than
ster users; mere provision of facilities, he or she may have author-
ized the infringement in question. The Court referred to(b) promotion of its services for use in unlawful
section 101(1A)’s non-exhaustive factors: 18 (a) the extentmusic file exchanges; and
(if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the
(c) omission in implementation of any filtering act concerned; (b) the nature of any relationship existing
devices, and the proportionality of its Web site between the person and the person who did the act
advertising revenue to the number of users. concerned; or (c) whether the person took any reason-
Accordingly, the Supreme Court unanimously dis- able steps to prevent or avoid the doing of the act,
agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision to uphold sum- including compliance with any relevant industry codes
mary judgment for the defendants. The case was of practice.
remanded back to the District Court for disposition. Sharman was found liable for authorizing users’ pri-
District Court Judge Stephen V. Wilson applied the mary copyright infringement, as the Court found ‘‘some-
inducement doctrine and found that StreamCast14 was thing more’’ than mere provision of facilities. In sum-
liable due to overwhelming evidence of unlawful intent, mary, the relevant circumstances included:
and of its objective to promote infringement. 15
(a) positive conduct by Sharman, including promo-
tion of its Web site as a file-sharing facility and
attempts to popularize unlawful file-sharing byP2P File-Sharing in Australia promoting the ‘‘Join the Revolution’’ movement;
harman Networks Ltd. (‘‘Sharman’’) distributed its (b) knowledge of the liable respondents of the pre-S Kazaa software through its Kazaa Internet P2P file- dominant infringing use and the fact that they
sharing system on a worldwide basis. The software was did nothing about it;
distributed for free. The system was based on the (c) financial interest of the respondents in
supernode model. increasing file-sharing; and
The works (‘‘blue files’’) were exchanged between (d) absence of any attempt to install any filtering
peers for free, and stored in the respective users’ com- devices. Following a detailed examination of the
puter in a My Shared Folder. A supernode constantly difficulties of installing filtering devices,
generated an index of all current blue files available in Wilcox J. concluded that it was nevertheless pos-
users’ My Shared Folders (within which that supernode sible to impose some form of filtering that
was connected). A user submitted a request for a certain would substantially reduce infringement.
file through the supernode. The terms of the search
The Court also found that five other respondentsrequest matching any part of the metadata of indexed
wielded real control over the Kazaa operations and itsfiles would yield those files as search results. The
file-sharing policies, and thus were deemed to have alsorequesting user picked the relevant file and downloaded
authorized the infringement.such file directly from the My Shared Folder of the other
user. Sharman derived its main source of revenue from
paid advertising on its Web site.
Authorization The Kazaa network also provided users with other
works (‘‘gold files’’) made available by licence with copy- ifferent interpretations of ‘‘authorization’’ have
right owners (through a tie-up with Alnet Inc. (‘‘Alnet’’). D arisen in the U.K., Australia, Canada, and Singa-
The music industry commenced legal action against pore. 19 Australian courts have chosen an expansive
Sharman, Alnet, and related companies. Also sued were approach, with Sharman widening it further. However,
the CEOs and key technology personnel, all of whom U.K., Canadian, and Singapore courts have adopted a
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control, is responsible for placing in the other’s hands mater-narrow approach. These different positions will be
ials which by their nature are almost inevitably to be usedexamined, followed by a look at how these principles
for the purpose of an infringement. 29translate into the P2P context.
This principle was expressly rejected by Lord Tem-
pleman in the U.K. case of Amstrad as being ‘‘stated
much too widely’’. 30The Different Positions 
So sellers of blank tapes31 and providers of a record
lending service32 (who also sold blank cassette tapes)1. U.K. 
were found not liable for authorization due to insuffi-
t has been held that an ordinary person would assume cient control over use of the tapes sold and recordsI that authorization can only come from somebody loaned. In contrast, effective control is not a prerequisite
having or purporting to have authority. 20 to finding authorization under Australian law.33
Authorization has also been understood to mean
‘‘sanction, approve and countenance’’. 21 This has not
(b) Indifference/Inaction been unequivocally accepted by all U.K. judges. 22
Generally, ‘‘authorize’’ is accepted without furtherNotably, the phrase is said to be read conjunctively. 23
comment by the U.K. courts as ‘‘sanction, approve andThe limits to this concept are highlighted by Whit-
countenance’’. However, Whitford J. in Ames Records34ford J. in CBS Inc. v. Ames Records and Tapes Ltd.
threw some doubt on ‘‘countenance’’ as it ostensibly(‘‘Ames Records’’) when he stated that ‘‘. . . an act is not
embraced the idea of ‘‘condone’’. In particular, Whit-authorized by somebody who merely enables or possibly
ford J. observed that ‘‘countenance’’ has the widestassists or even encourages another to do that act, but
meaning and held that ‘‘[i]f Parliament had intended to[does] not purport to have any authority which he can
give copyright owners the sole right to give countenancegrant to justify the doing of the act’’. 24
to infringing acts, then no doubt they would have said so
Whitford J. accepted that authorization may be in plain terms’’. 35
implied, and that indifference may in appropriate cir-
Therefore, although the U.K. judgments do not rulecumstances amount to authorization.
out indifference or inaction as constituting ‘‘authoriza-
CBS Songs Ltd. v. Amstrad Consumer Electronics tion’’, Ames Records suggests that it may be difficult for
plc. (‘‘Amstrad’’) 25 held there is no authorization where any act of mere indifference to be regarded as authoriza-
there is no control at the time of the primary infringe- tion. In this case, the defendant, who operated a record
ment over how the consumer is going to use or misuse and disc lending service, also sold blank cassette tapes on
the materials supplied. the same premises and at a discount. The defendant was
In Amstrad, the material supplied was the twin-deck prepared to concede that he knew that home taping of
tape-recording machine, while in CBS, the defendant the records loaned might take place. During a certain
operated a library service, lending to customers original period, he omitted to place a warning against copyright
discs and tapes, and also sold blank cassette tapes at a infringement. All these were insufficient to constitute a
discount. In both cases, the courts refused to find author- quality of indifference amounting to authorization.
ization as there was no real control post distribution. Such indifference would thus be only ‘‘the indiffer-
Amstrad held that the supplier of the recording machine ence of somebody who did not consider it his business
merely conferred on the purchaser the power to copy to interfere, who had no desire to see another person’s
but did not grant or purport to grant the right to copy. 26 copyright infringed, but whose view was that copyright
Amstrad expressly rejected the wider Australian and infringement were matters in this case not for him,
approach. 27 but for the owners of the copyright’’. This was not legally
The U.K. judgments suggest a preference for a nar- reprehensible. In contrast, under Australian law, it is
rower approach as seen in the following aspects: easier for inaction and omission to constitute authoriza-
tion. 36
(a) Control 
For the supply of equipment or technology used by (c) Inevitable Infringing Use others to commit copyright infringement, real and effec-
So long as there is no control at the time of infringe-tive control seems necessary for ‘‘authorization’’ to be
ment, there appears to be no authorization, even if theeven considered. Only with control will the courts move
materials supplied ‘‘by their nature are almost inevitablyon to consider any real or purported authority.
used for the purpose of an infringement’’. 37 This com-This is borne out by express rejection of the prin- ment was made by Templeman J. in Amstrad in respectciple enunciated in the Australian case of RCA Corp. v. of Ames Records, which dealt with the lending of orig-John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. 28 that: inal records and selling of blank cassette tapes by the
. . . a person may be said to authorize another to commit an defendant.infringement if the one has some form of control over the
other at the time of infringement or, if he has no such Whitford J. in Ames Records had observed that:
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. . . you can home tape from bought records, borrowed cific product will be used for a particular copyright
records, borrowed from friends or public libraries, from the breach. What he does have is only a general idea that
playing of records over the radio, and indeed, at no expense, such types of product may or will be used to infringefrom records which can be obtained for trial periods on
copyright. This is insufficient to establish liability forintroductory offers from many record clubs who advertise
in the papers, who are prepared to let you have up to three material contribution in the U.S.
or four records for a limited period of trial free of any charge
From the Australian perspective, judicial commentwhatsoever. 38
suggests a departure from such a narrow idea of causa-Commenting on Whitford J.’s observation, Tem- tion. 46pleman J. stated:
These borrowed records together with all recording
machines and blank tapes could be said to be ‘‘materials (e) Knowledge 
which by their nature are almost inevitably used for the
purpose of an infringement’’. But lenders and sellers do not Some form of knowledge or intent is implicit in the
authorize infringing use. 39 U.K. concept of authorization. The knowledge is either
actual or constructive.The question is whether the supply of merely an ele-
ment that, together with other components obtained This is similar to the U.S. position, where knowl-
elsewhere, will be almost certainly used to infringe copy- edge is a necessary component of the doctrines of con-
right renders a person liable in authorization. For a tributory infringement and inducement of infringement.
person to supply all of the elements (for instance, the The Australian courts depart from this and accept there
original record, cassette tape, and the equipment to copy may be authorization without knowledge. 47
the songs onto the tape) that would inevitably be used to
breach copyright is unacceptable. This was indicated by
Whitford J. in Ames Records. 40 2. Australia 
Templeman J.’s remarks, however, seem to admit of The seminal case of Moorhouse v. University of
a defence that as long as a person does not supply all of New South Wales48 (‘‘Moorhouse’’) held that authoriza-
the components required to enable copyright breach, the tion of an infringing act means the approval, counte-
person does not authorize infringing use. This is particu- nance, sanctioning, or permitting of such act. 49 Specifi-
larly if the certain components are freely available from cally, Gibbs J. in the case noted that ‘‘authorize’’ and
other sources; for instance, many libraries are willing to ‘‘permit’’ were synonymous. 50
lend records and retailers are willing to deliver records Moorhouse involved the provision of photocopyingfor a trial period. This would be so even if it was almost facilities by the University of New South Wales close toinevitable that the element or component supplied its library. The Australian High Court held that therewould be used with components obtained elsewhere by was authorization by the University of wrongful repro-the consumer to directly make illegal copies. If so, this duction by library users of copyrighted books. The Uni-runs counter to both Australian41 and U.S. 42 courts that versity exercised real and effective control of thehave indicated liability is most likely to attach for prod- machines placed on its premises but failed to post ade-ucts that are ‘‘good for nothing else’’ but infringement, quate warnings about, and supervise, copyright infringe-even without post-distribution control. ment.
Significantly, Jacobs J. characterized the issue as
(d) Specific Authorization of an Actual Breach of whether an unqualified invitation was made to a poten-
Copyright tial infringer to use the photocopier as he saw fit. 51
The U.K. doctrine requires proof of ‘‘some specific To that extent, this would be an invitation to do
authorization of an actual breach of copyright’’. 43 such acts comprised within the copyright of authors
Alleging only authorization at large is insufficient. This whose books are on the library shelves. Such an invita-
requirement seems somehow connected to the causation tion would constitute authorization.
factor, i.e., that the authorization in question actually did
The 2000 amendments to the Australian Copyrightcause the primary copyright breach. Authorization of an
Act are not seen as overriding Moorhouse except to theactual breach of copyright is, in the words of Foster J., ‘‘by
extent of the safe harbour provision in section 112E.52some act directly related to that breach, and involves
Section 101(1A) provided guidelines on what might con-some element of causation . . . ’’. 44 Interestingly, the U.S.
stitute authorization; namely, the alleged authorizingSony defence echoes this — it bars secondary liability
party’s power to prevent the infringement, the relation-based on ‘‘presuming or imputing intent to cause
ship between the alleged authorizing party and theinfringement solely from the design or distribution of a
direct infringer, and whether reasonable steps were takenproduct capable of substantial lawful uses, which the
to prevent or avoid doing of the act. 53distributor knows is in fact used for infringement’’. 45 The
Section 101(1A) was regarded by Wilcox J. inSony doctrine makes it difficult to pin liability on a
Sharman as merely codifying the law on authorizationdistributor because at the time of distributing the
pre-2000. 54 In the light of Moorhouse and Sharman, theproduct, the distributor does not know whether the spe-
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Australian approach is more expansive than U.K. law in In Sharman, significantly, the court emphasized the
the following aspects. ability of the respondents to prevent, or at least signifi-
cantly reduce, the extent of copyright infringement. 59
(a) Power to Prevent and Permitting Direct
Infringement 
No Ongoing Control Needed Section 101(1A) of the Australian Copyright Act
introduces the alleged authorizing party’s power to pre- Moorhouse may be explained on the ground that
vent direct infringement as a highly relevant factor in there was continuing control of the photocopiers, as
determining authorization. This new section, together Jacobs J. and, particularly, Gibbs J. 60 referred to contin-
with the Sharman decision, ushers in a more liberal uing control as a significant feature for authorization
order than even the Moorhouse position (which itself liability. However, Sharman seems to have gone some
was already wider than the U.K. position). way towards emasculating even this concept. 61
On the Sharman facts, the distributor of the P2P
Permitting software already had no effective control over how the
software was going to be used after the point of distribu-Permitting as a form of authorization is wider than
tion, whether for infringing or non-infringing purposes.that which can only arise from somebody having or
Yet, authorization liability was found, implying thatpurporting to have authority. The latter is the narrower
ongoing control is no longer necessary in the AustralianEnglish concept earlier discussed. 55
context. 62 Wilcox J. in Sharman stated ‘‘[i]f Sharman had
not provided to users the facilities necessary for file-The Unqualified Invitation 
sharing, there would be no Kazaa file-sharing at all’’.The unqualified invitation to a customer to use a
This hints at a different principle based on causa-tool that may be used to perpetuate direct copyright
tion and power to prevent. The mere fact of distributioninfringement may constitute authorization. This gives an
set into motion events leading up to the user employingexceedingly broad take on authorization. In Moorhouse,
the software to illegally exchange music files. WithoutJacobs J. emphasized this aspect more than the fact that
this initial distribution, the copyright infringementthere was continuing control by the University over the
might never have occurred. Further, the words ‘‘(if any)’’photocopier. To this extent, Jacobs J.’s approach has been
qualifies section 101(1A)(a), suggesting there may pos-described as ‘‘what is not specifically excluded is to be
sibly be authorization without preventive power and,taken to be permitted’’. 56 While Sharman affirmed that
hence, no control. 63Moorhouse was unchanged by section 101(1A), Wilcox J.
in Sharman did not expressly approve Jacobs J.’s ‘‘invita-
tion’’ theory.
(b) Indifference/Inaction 
Control vs Power to Prevent Countenance, or permitting direct infringement,
implies lack of positive action or active participation orGibbs J. in Moorhouse approved the principle that
contribution towards such infringement.‘‘[a] person cannot be said to authorize an infringement
of copyright unless he has some power to prevent it’’. 57 Inactivity or indifference, exhibited by acts of com-
mission or omission, may reach a degree from which anPreventive power is conceptually broader than real
authorization or permission may be inferred. This hasand effective control. A person may have no effective
been again approved in Sharman.64 Sections 101(1A)(a)control post-distribution over how technology provided
and (c) of the Australian Copyright Act, in referring to aor materials supplied are going to be used. Yet in a wider
person’s power to prevent infringement as a relevantsense, he or she may still have the power to prevent
factor, show a greater willingness to find authorizationdirect copyright infringement. Consider the scenario
for failure to do something.where the continuing distribution of technology is
known by the distributor to have been used by earlier Significantly, Sharman imposed a duty on the
users to infringe copyright, and suspected or known by software distributor to incorporate filtering devices in
the distributor to be likely to be used by subsequent future products, as well as attempting to persuade
users for infringement. Arguably, the distributor has the existing users of software already downloaded to volun-
power to prevent future copyright infringement and did tarily upgrade to a new version of the software with such
not do so by ceasing the supply of the technology. filtering features. This was despite evidence showing that
one type of filtering would involve problems of filteringIn this context, Gibbs J.’s statement is exceedingly
out files that could be legally exchanged. It was enoughwide, for it implies that such preventive power is neces-
that such filtering would substantially reduce illegal file-sary to constitute authorization. Section 101(1A) of the
sharing. In the Sharman context, this duty is an ongoingCopyright Act affirms this principle, although it merely
obligation imposed in a fact scenario where no real con-states preventive power as one of the many factors to be
trol existed after distribution. 65considered. 58
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(c) Inevitable Infringing Use files. Arguably, the apparent dispensation by Jacobs J.
with the knowledge requirement may be with regard toThe Australian approach makes it difficult to escape
dispensing with the proof of knowledge as opposed toauthorization liability for distribution of a product that
the knowledge requirement itself. In other words, con-will be inevitably used for infringing purposes. 66
structive knowledge would at least be presumed in cer-
tain cases.(d) Specificity of Authorization 
However, Jacobs J.’s and Wilcox J.’s failure to clearlyA commonly held view is that general exhortations
say this implies there may be instances where the courtsto infringe are not sufficient, unless specific acts of
will not trouble themselves with the knowledge require-infringement can be established. 67 However, the degree
ment, constructive or otherwise.of specificity is relative. It appears that Australian courts
are less strict on the extent of specificity of the infringing
acts alleged to have been authorized. In Moorhouse, 3. Canada 
Gibbs J. stated that:
In CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of UpperAlthough in some of the authorities it is said that the
Canada (‘‘CCH v. LSUC’’), 75 the Supreme Court ofperson who authorizes an infringement must have knowl-
edge or reason to suspect that the particular act of infringe- Canada has expressly rejected Moorhouse as being
ment is likely to be done, it is clearly sufficient if there is inconsistent with the Canadian concept of authorization.
knowledge or reason to suspect that any one of a number of
McLachlin C.J. opined:particular acts is likely to be done, as for example, where the
proprietor of a shop installs a gramophone and supplies a In my view, the Moorhouse approach to authorizationnumber of records any one of which may be played on it: shifts the balance in copyright too far in favour of theWinstone v. Wurlitzer Automatic Phonograph Co. of Aus- owner’s rights and unnecessarily interferes with the propertralia Pty Ltd., supra. 68 use of copyrighted works for the good of society as a
whole. 76The Sharman facts and decision also seem to require
authorization to be of a low degree of specificity. In that The facts in CCH v. LSUC are strikingly similar to Moor-
case, Wilcox J. found that the software distributor knew house. The Law Society of Upper Canada maintained
of the predominant infringing use of the software by within its legal library free-standing photocopiers that
users. 69 Yet, as the software could be used legally to were used by patrons to photocopy its law materials. The
exchange non-infringing materials, the distributor could publishers of the legal materials claimed the Law Society
not be said to know with any degree of particularity authorized allegedly unlawful copying.
whether, at the point of distribution, the software was
In this case, McLachlin C.J . accepted thatgoing to be wrongfully or rightfully used, and if wrong-
‘‘authorize’’ means ‘‘sanction, approve and counte-fully used, in respect of a particular MP3 file. Extending
nance’’. 77 Of ‘‘countenance’’, the Chief Justice acceptedthe duty to implement anti-infringement features to
that it must be understood in its strongest dictionaryfuture versions of the software further dilutes any speci-
meaning, ‘‘namely, give approval to, sanction, permit,ficity of the authorization.
favour, encourage’’. 78 This is inferred from acts that are
‘‘less than direct and positive, including a sufficient(e) Knowledge 
degree of indifference’’. 79
Traditionally, the mental element in authorization
However, she found, as one of the grounds of herrequires either actual or constructive knowledge. Author-
decision, that the Law Society lacked sufficient controlization by a person could not be inferred from mere
over the users who photocopied its materials.inactivity if he or she neither knew nor had reason to
McLachlin C.J. highlighted the absence of anysuspect the act might be carried out. This, at least, was
master–servant or employer–employee relationship thatthe position adopted by Gibbs J. in Moorhouse. 70
would result in the Law Society having control over end
In the same case, Jacobs J., in keeping with his lib- users.
eral interpretation, held that, where the making available
This decision is important, because while the Aus-of a technology constitutes an unqualified invitation to
tralian courts are inclined towards the liberal side, thecarry out infringing acts, then knowledge need not be
Canadian Supreme Court has swung decidedly to theproven. 71 (However, for a qualified invitation that did
other side in giving a new meaning to control.not extend to doing of acts comprised in copyright,
knowledge is relevant if it is known that the qualification It should be noted that the self-service photocopiers
to the invitation was being ignored.) 72 While  not were within the library itself, and to that extent were
directly affirming Jacobs J.’s ‘‘ invitation’’ theory, 73 capable of some monitoring by the Law Society. The
Wilcox J. in Sharman has affirmed that ‘‘there may be society could and did set the conditions of use; the times
authorization without knowledge’’. 74 of and charges for use were set by the society. Ordinarily,
this would be seen as control over the photocopiers, as inSharman involved a case of actual knowledge, i.e.,
the Moorhouse holding. Control should be distin-the distributor of the P2P software was found to actually
guished from supervision. The society’s inability orknow of user infringement in illegally exchanging music
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failure to monitor each and every user and what he or case, there was no proof of such actual notice. Binnie J.
she photocopies is rightly a supervisory issue. observed:
The knowledge that someone might be using neutralIn other words, there can be control together with
technology to violate copyright . . . is not necessarily suffi-imperfect or inadequate supervision. Existence of control
cient to constitute authorization, which requires a demon-should not of itself mean liability, provided there is ade- stration that the defendant did ‘‘[g]ive approval to, sanction,
quate supervision. permit, favour, encourage’’ . . . the infringing conduct. 90
McLachlin C.J. seems, however, to have equated On the Grokster and Sharman facts, the Canadian
control with supervision when concluding that the Law position is likely to yield a no-authorization finding, no
Society was regarded as not having control ‘‘over which matter how questionable the conduct (whether positive
works were being copied, the users’ purposes for copying conduct or indifference). This is because in the decen-
nor over the photocopiers themselves’’. 80 tralized or supernode networks there would be no con-
trol over the software, the music files being copied, norTaken to its logical conclusion, this reasoning
the purpose for which the copying was done. Even formeans that as it is not possible to track each and every
the centralized network, the Canadian position maywork being copied, or each and every user’s purpose in
arguably be applied to find there was no control, and,copying, there is thus no control exercised by the Law
hence, no authorization.Society. This is an extreme position, because it is in rare
cases where there is control and perfect supervision over While the Supreme Court in CCH v. LSUC wanted
each and every usage of the technology in question. to strike an equilibrium between the copyright owners’
CCH v. LSUC has far-reaching implications when and users’ rights, it could have avoided the artificiality of
considered in its context. The Law Society: its finding of lack of control and achieved the same no-
authorization holding by finding that (a) the posting of a(a) placed or caused to be placed free-standing
copyright warning notice was sufficient preventivephotocopiers within its library premises; 81
action; or (b) there was no actual knowledge of specific
(b) had continuing control over the photocopiers in infringement (as highlighted in SOCAN v. CAIP). Alter-
that it could implement stricter supervision, natively, it could have confined its no-authorization
determine and change the conditions and times finding to the ground that no evidence was tendered to
of use, and reduce the number of copiers (or show that the photocopiers were used in an infringing
even discontinue any such facility); 82 manner. 91
(c) should arguably have known or suspected that a This resistance to ever-expanding copyright owners’
number of users were photocopying in breach rights is echoed in BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe (Fed-
of the copyright laws; 83 and eral Court). 92 Here, the issue was whether ISPs could be
(d) did not supervise at all. 84 forced to disclose identities of their subscribers who
were swapping music files over the Internet.The subsequent case of SOCAN v. CAIP (Supreme
Court of Canada)85 concerned the Internet service pro- In considering authorization, Justice von Fincken-
vider’s (‘‘ISP’’) liability for users’ exchange of music files stein noted that the mere fact of placing a copy on a
online. Binnie J. held that section 2.4(1)(b) of the Cana- shared directory in a computer where that copy could be
dian Copyright Act86 applied to protect the ISP, which accessed via a P2P service does not amount to distribu-
acted as a mere conduit of subject-matter and did not tion. 93 To constitute distribution, there had to be a posi-
communicate such subject-matter in breach of copy- tive act by the owner of the shared directory, such as the
right. 87 sending of the copies, or advertising that they are avail-
able for copying. 94On the additional issue of whether the ISP author-
ized such exchange of files, Binnie J. affirmed CCH v. These comments have subsequently been overruled
LSUC and commented: in the Federal Court of Appeal as ‘‘it is premature to
The operation of the Internet is obviously a good deal reach any conclusion as to the applicability of the CCH
more complicated than the operation of a photocopier, but case’’. 95 This was because not all the evidence had been
it is true here, as it was in the CCH case, that when massive presented in this application for the disclosure order. Toamounts of non-copyrighted materials are accessible to the
this extent, the comments (or ‘‘hard conclusions’’) 96 areend user, it is not possible to impute to the Internet Service
no longer applicable. The Federal Court of AppealProvider, based solely on the provision of Internet facilities,
an authority to download copyrighted material as opposed reserved for future consideration the question of
to non-copyrighted material. 88 whether users’ acts of copying the songs onto a shared
But what seemed critical to the issue was whether there directory constituted authorization on the basis of invita-
was actual knowledge of the ISP of any specific infringe- tion, and permission to other persons with Internet
ment. This could be through a notice of infringing con- access to have the musical works communicated to and
tent; failure by the ISP to respond to such notice by be copied by them.97 To what extent subsequent cases
removing such content ‘‘may in some circumstances’’ 89 will expand or restrict the concept of authorization
lead to a finding of authorization. On the facts of the remains to be seen.
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Records that authorization of a breach must be ‘‘by some4. Singapore 
act directly related to that breach, and involves someThe Singapore position on authorization is much
element of causation. . . . ’’. 101less clear. The landmark case Ong Seow Pheng & Others
v. Lotus Development Corp98 (‘‘Ong Seow Pheng (Court But this is surely very different from the supply of
of Appeal)’’) involved the supply by the defendant of infringing copies themselves ‘‘on a wholesale basis to
infringing copies of a software manual and a single persons whom [the supplier] knew were in the business
infringing copy of the software itself. The recipient was of retailing pirated computer packages to the public’’. 102
known to the defendant to be in the business of selling One defendant had in fact specifically told the recipient
illegal software. ‘‘to make as many copies of the programme as he needed
in order to make complete packages for sale to theDespite proximity and directness of the supply by
public’’. 103 The inevitability104 of the use by the recipientthe supplier and the copyright infringement by the
of these infringing copies itself further distinguishes thereceiving party, the Singapore Court of Appeal held there
Singapore case from the English cases, and led Judithwas no authorization. This may be contrasted with the
Prakash J. to hold that there was authorization. This wassupply of equipment that is capable of being used for
overruled by the Court of Appeal.legal and illegal reproductions — a less direct contribu-
tion to copyright infringement by the user. The Singapore Court of Appeal’s application of the
‘‘control’’ criterion (as discerned from English cases withYet the court, while taking note of the difference in
very different facts) to the facts of Ong Seow Phengthe two scenarios, was overwhelmingly influenced by
(Court of Appeal) may be seen as overemphasizing thecontinuing control (or lack thereof) as the determinative
importance of control, almost to the exclusion of otherfactor.
factors. That other factors should not always be totally
Relying on CBS and Amstrad (both English cases), disregarded is seen in the phrase ‘‘sanction, approve and
and Moorhouse (Australia), the court distinguished the countenance’’, 105 which was cited by the Singapore court
English cases from the Australian case on the issue of with approval. For cases other than provision of equip-
control. While ostensibly approving these cases, the court ment or technology used for infringing purposes, the
failed to specifically comment and indicate its views on degree of indifference and proximity between the provi-
the different scopes of ‘‘authorization’’ in these jurisdic- sion and illegal reproduction may be so immediate and
tions. have such an impact that lack of continuing control
should no longer be determinative. 106In particular, Ong Seow Pheng (Court of Appeal)
approved U.K.’s Amstrad. L.P. Thean J.A. in the Court of
Appeal expressly stated:
We accept that Ong supplied Lur with a copy of the Two Scenarios programme together with the manuals. In doing so, he
might well have suggested to Lur that copies of the
n the P2P file-sharing context, two scenarios are con-programmes could be made. However, that is was [sic] a far
cry from saying that the appellants thereby authorized Lur I trasted: where there is ongoing control by the distrib-
to make copies of the programme. He might have facili- utor, i.e., continuing control post-distribution; and where
tated, and even incited, Lur’s infringements, but as was held there is control only at the point of distribution. Thein CBS Songs [v] Amstrad, that is not the same thing as
comments apply equally to any new technologyauthorization. As the learned judge held, and we agree with
launched from time to time that is capable of bothher, once the appellants had sold and delivered the
infringing copies of the manuals or programmes to Lur, proper and wrongful uses by the end user.
these copies were out of their hands and they had no con-
There is thus an interplay of positive wrongful con-trol over what Lur would do with reference to them.
Clearly, the Moorhouse case has no application here. 99 duct, quality of preventive action, and lack of action. The
various jurisdictions place different emphasis on eachThe scope of authorization in Singapore thus remains
factor in each of the scenarios.unclear. In disapplying Moorhouse on the ground of
control, it seems that this factor will be decisive in most
cases. Arguably, Singapore’s position is narrower than the 1. Ongoing Control English position.
The existence of ongoing control, even after theAmes Records and Amstrad deal with the supply of
time of distribution, appears to necessarily imply preven-original materials (i.e., records) or equipment (i.e., hi-
tive power. The question arises: what kind of preventivespeed recorders). Similarly, for the supply of blank cas-
action might be needed to escape liability, if any?sette tapes in A & M Records Inc. v. Audio Magnetics Inc.
(U.K.) Ltd. (‘‘A&M Records’’). 100 These materials could Such preventive action should be contrasted with
have been used for good or evil. Without ongoing con- positive wrongful conduct. The latter might include pro-
trol post-distribution, there is little direct, causative effect vocative advertisements that show an intent to influence
on the ultimate copyright infringement by the user. This in some way a user to apply the technology for
observation springs from Foster J.’s comment in A&M infringing purposes, providing assistance to users who
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have trouble using the technology, and providing both ness of filtering devices would either increase or reduce
technology and infringing materials together to users. the burden on the innovator and distributor.
It may not be difficult to find authorization where It is most improbable that courts will ever require
there is ongoing control plus such positive wrongful con- measures to totally prevent primary infringement. How-
duct. However, the final conclusion depends on many ever, copyright seeks a balance between encouraging the
other factors that may negate or diminish the effect of creativity and innovation of copyright owners and fair
such positive conduct. use of copyrighted materials and, arguably, the innova-
tion of copying-enabling technology and the right of use.These factors are broadly classified as preventive
This equation is compounded by the right of users toaction such as warnings, installing of anti-infringement
lawful usage of the technology and the attendantdevices, and general supervision.
freedom of access to information. In other words, what is
For instance, posting warnings against deploying the half-hearted or effective remains a vexed issue. As dis-
technology for infringing purposes would go some way cussed below, Sharman appears to require that filtering
towards reducing the possibility of a finding of authori- measures be able to ‘‘substantially reduce’’ 114 primary
zation. The wording and conspicuousness of the infringement. But there was no ongoing control in
warning play an important role. In Moorhouse Sharman — this suggests that, in ongoing control cases,
(involving photocopiers), a warning was placed in a at least the same or higher level of preventive measures
library guide issued to students. This was found to be should be implemented in Australia. (The problems
inaccurate in stating that photocopying could be done relating to the phrase itself are further dealt with
for research or private study, as it did not qualify that this below.) 115
was subject to fair dealing. Another warning was placed
This is due to the generous width given to theon the photocopying machines but was not relevant to
‘‘authorization’’ concept. Arguably, authorization is moreusers.
easily found in Australia, though there is no blatant mis-Australian courts take a robust practical approach conduct. Not doing anything or failing to do enoughand look at the actual effect of the warning on users. 107 towards preventing primary infringement may be suffi-For the warning to indicate that a copy of the applicable cient to found liability. This was so in Moorhouse, wherecopyright act was available for reading is not enough, as liability was based on a series of ineffectual preventiveit is likely to be obscure to the layperson. 108 measures (inadequate warnings and ineffective supervi-
Sharman took a dim view of the warning posted by sion of the photocopiers by the university library).
the P2P distributor, as the warning did not clearly state
In the U.K., it is unclear how the courts will treat thethat music files were likely to be subject to copyright and
act of distributing new technology that is used forthat sharing such files online would violate copyright. 109
infringing purposes but is capable of being used for non-Again, the court measured the efficacy of the warning by
infringing purposes as well. Given the narrower scope oflooking at its actual effect and noted that the advertising
‘‘authorization’’, it may be harder to impose authoriza-and other blatant conduct negated the warning. 110
tion liability on a distributor of new technology where
Another preventive measure is the installation of such person is merely indifferent. The English court in
filtering devices, which may be given great importance, CBS has disagreed that ‘‘authorization’’ should encom-
depending on the jurisdiction. Obviously, the sufficiency pass ‘‘countenance’’ or ‘‘condone’’ as this would be too
and extent of such measures to counteract any blatant wide a meaning. 116 Notably, CBS involved no contin-
wrongful conduct have significant impact on new tech- uing control after distribution — this may account for
nology design. the narrower approach. In the U.K., it may indeed also
be easier to neutralize the effect of wrongful conductSupervision (or lack thereof) is a preventive step that
with a less exacting standard of preventive action thanflows from retention of control by the distributor over
that required under Australian law.the way users apply the technology. In Moorhouse, it was
noted that the trial judge found that the photocopying In Singapore, the position remains unclear, not least
machines ‘‘were unsupervised in any practical and useful because the court in Ong Seow Pheng (Court of Appeal)
sense, with the knowledge of the University librarian’’. 111 approved both the U.K. and Australian cases that advo-
In other words, the supervision was not of an effective cated very different approaches.
kind. 112
For P2P file-sharing and other new technology in
the Australian context, where there is ongoing control 2. Control Only at the Point of Sale or
over the manner of use of the technology, great emphasis Distribution 
will be placed on preventive action and omission to
supervise or monitor infringement. Moorhouse would Distribution of video recorders, tape recorders, and
require effective supervision, not just any half-hearted Grokster-type P2P file-sharing software has the common
attempt. 113 The standard set by courts for the effective- feature that, after the point of distribution, the distrib-
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utor no longer has control over the product being dis- This is the way the Australian courts have gone by
tributed. Three issues arise here; namely, widening the authorization concept so as not to solely
depend on actual continuing control, but also to con-(i) Is control the sine qua non of authorization?
sider the power to prevent, and a host of other conduct-(ii) Does lack of ongoing control mean there is related117 factors. Thus, from the Australian viewpoint,no power to prevent? lack of direct control is not an obstacle to taking steps to
(iii) What can amount to authorization if there is prevent infringement.
no control?
(iii) What Can Amount to Authorization if There
(i) Is Control the Sine Qua Non of Authorization? Is No Control? 
In Australia, the answer is no. In the U.K. and While the courts of some jurisdictions grapple withCanada, control seems necessary for finding authoriza- the significance of control, the Australian position getstion liability. This is gleaned from U.K. and Canadian around this issue in a few ways.cases dealing with the distribution of copying-enabling
or reproduction technology. One way simply treats control as no longer that
important. 118 The other is to adopt an extremely broadThere seems to be no justification to extend the
view of control. The rationale is that, even if the distrib-U.K. position to other situations other than the supply of
utor did not control the manner of continuing usage bysuch technology. For instance, the supply of actual
the user, the distributor, in continuing to release more ofinfringing materials themselves may be differentiated
such products for new users, is by the act of distributionfrom distribution of copying-enabling technology.
itself contributing to such future infringement. To thisSingapore appears to have taken the narrowest posi- extent, the control is more expansive.tion to date and applied the control test as determina-
The above is useless in fixing liability if the suppliertive, even though in Ong Seow Pheng (Court of Appeal)
had to have actual knowledge of specific infringement.the impact of supplying infringing materials could be
In view of the lack of real ongoing control, as on thesaid to be directly linked to the actual sale of these
Sharman and Grokster facts, it is difficult to prove thatinfringing materials (i.e., the software manuals) and fur-
such a distributor possessed such knowledge.ther reproduction of the materials for sale (i.e., the
software program itself). A fortiori for the supply of cop- To overcome this, the Australian courts have stated
ying-enabling technology that may be used for both legal that it is not necessary to have knowledge of a particular
and illegal purposes. infringing act. It is sufficient for there to be knowledge or
reason to suspect that any one of a number of particular
infringing acts is likely to be done.(ii) Does Lack of Ongoing Control Mean There Is
No Power To Prevent? Yet another liberalization was in the form of a wide
It may appear easy to justify not doing enough to preventive duty and even allowing authorization to
prevent infringement because of having no ongoing con- include mere countenance. Accordingly, indifference
trol. This certainly seems the case in Singapore and the and omission assume increased significance in the Aus-
U.K. tralian context. This presents perhaps the greatest chal-
lenge, for it raises the knotty issue of how much isIn other words, it is less easy to blame the technolo-
enough. While for continuing control, it is easier to jus-gist on account of failure to implement anti-filtering fea-
tify imposing a duty to actively take steps towardstures in his or her technology, much less track the
preventing infringement, it is much less clear for a casemanner of use by the users.
of no ongoing control.The ‘‘control’’ criterion can be very misleading,
because it seems to unduly hinge the weighty issue of Wilcox J. in Sharman expressed his concern that he
‘‘authorization’’ on a single factor. It is true that control is should not make an order ‘‘which the respondents are
very important in many cases, but, with the advent of not able to obey, except at the unacceptable cost of
new technology in P2P file-sharing, it is submitted that preventing the sharing even of files which do not
‘‘control’’ misdirects the enquiry from the start by infringe the applicants’ copyright’’. 119 Wilcox J. observed
ignoring or failing to give due weight to other relevant that the keyword filtering and/or gold file flood filtering
conduct. Authorization can come from somebody who would ‘‘substantially reduce’’ 120 the frequency of copy-
purports to have authority even though he has no real right file-sharing. While keyword filtering would imper-
control — purporting depends to a large extent on the fectly fail to detect copyrighted materials bearing a file
appearance of things to third parties, and this must name carrying metadata deliberately altered to circum-
derive from wrongful conduct or lack of appropriate vent such detection (i.e., false negatives) and wrongly
action as well as the reality of whether there is actual filter out non-copyrighted files (i.e., false positives),
control. In other words, control should only be one of Wilcox J. felt that in the Sharman context, false positives
the factors, not necessarily the determinative one. would not be a frequent occurrence, as the sharing was
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predominantly of copyrighted popular music. Weighing Other Causes of Action 
the negative consequences to legitimate users against the
benefit to copyright owners, the judge felt that the
imperfect filter ‘‘would go far to protect copyright
1. Joint Tortfeasor owners’’. 121
ersons are joint tortfeasors when their respectiveThe above suggests that if proposed measures do P shares in the commission of the tort are done innot ‘‘substantially reduce’’ the infringement or involve an
furtherance of a common design. 128unacceptable sacrifice of wrongly filtering out too many
non-copyright files, then it would not be too necessary to In Amstrad (sale of twin-deck tape-recording
implement these measures. What does or does not sub- machines), Templeman J. held that there was no joint
stantially reduce and how much is too many are difficult tortfeasorship between the distributor of hi-speed tape
questions. recorders and the primary infringers. He explained:
. . . Amstrad sells models which include facilities forInterestingly, in this whole equation, Wilcox J. did
receiving and recording broadcasts, disc records and tapednot emphasize or factor in the result of implementing records. All these facilities are lawful although the recording
devices that may be very effective but which unduly device is capable of being used for unlawful purposes. Once
a model is sold, Amstrad has no control over or interest inhinder the design and marketability of the product, or
its use. In these circumstances the allegation that Amstrad issimply involve too high a supervisory/design cost to the
a joint infringer is untenable. . . . In the present case there istechnologist. 122 no common design between Amstrad and anybody else to
infringe copyright. 129
Another practical difficulty lies in the Court holding
This test considers whether the machine was capable ofthat, to avoid inference of authorization, another mea-
being used for lawful or unlawful purposes. If thesure would be to put ‘‘maximum pressure’’ 123 on existing
machine was capable of being used for both such pur-users of the software to upgrade their software (without
poses, it would be harder to find a common designany filtering technology) to one that contains non-
between distributor and customers, as at least some usersoptional filtering features. What would be sufficient to
might be using it for legal purposes. The test also con-constitute ‘‘maximum pressure’’ is too fraught with great
siders whether the distributor had control over theuncertainty.
product post-distribution.
The Australian Federal Court stipulated in one of its In the P2P file-sharing context, the phrase ‘‘capable
orders (referred to as ‘‘order 4’’) that an order be made of being used for unlawful purposes’’ requires clarifica-
‘‘restraining the six infringing respondents from further tion.
infringing the applicants’ copyright in any sound record-
A similar phrase ‘‘capable of substantial non-ings by authorizing the doing in Australia by Kazaa users
infringing use’’ in the U.S. Sony doctrine continues toof any infringing acts, in relation to any sound recording,
generate considerable debate as to its meaning. Thethe copyright of which is held by any of the applicants, narrow approach emphasizes the ‘‘substantial’’ elementwithout the licence of the relevant copyright owner’’. 124 over the ‘‘capable’’ element and attempts to balance cur-
rent and potential non-infringing uses against infringingThe court stated that continuation of the system
uses. 130 The broad interpretation merely asks whether awith the filtering devices and other measures described
technology is merely capable of non-infringing uses inabove would not be deemed to contravene order 4.
commerce without comparing the proportion of non-
infringing uses to infringing uses. 131Order 4 has been challenged in an appeal for its
ambiguity. 125 In response to contempt proceedings for The U.S. uncertainties, when translated into the
failure to comply with order 4, Sharman characterized U.K. and Singapore context, raise the following concerns.
the order as ‘‘ambiguous’’ and ‘‘not an order non-compli- If the technology is, in reality, used for substantially
ance with which is capable of founding a contempt pro- illegal purposes, is it easier to infer a common design?
ceeding’’. 126 How should degree and extent of legal use versus
unlawful use be considered? No clear answers exist.
The continuing saga of Sharman illustrates the great
Another issue deals with lack of control. If there isdifficulty in setting not just proper but workable bound-
no control, can there still be joint tortfeasorship?aries of copyright protection that do not encroach on the
user’s freedom of access to non-copyrighted materials. In Lotus Development Corporation v. Ong Seow
Crafting an effectively enforceable order presents Pheng (Singapore High Court), 132 Judith Prakash J. held
another challenge. Compounding this is the question of that the defendant supplied infringing copies of a
the extent, if any, to which the needs and interests of the manual plus a single copy of software to a customer
known to the first defendant to be used for further illegaltechnologist should be taken into account. 127
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reproduction. 133 The evidence showed that ‘‘the first tions of its machine to any purchaser who may
defendant himself specifically told Mr. Lur to make as decide to purchase unlawfully. [The defendant]
many copies of the programme as he needed in order to is not concerned to procure and cannot procure
make complete packages for sale to the public’’. 134 The unlawful copying. The purchaser will not make
judge characterized the pirated master programme dis- unlawful copies because he has been induced or
kettes supplied by the first defendant as ‘‘only capable of incited or persuaded to do so by [the defendant].
one illegal purpose in the hands of the retail pirates’’. 135 The purchaser will make unlawful copies for his
Prakash J. held that there was a common design between own use because he chooses to do so’’. 143
the first defendant and his customers. This was despite Applying this to the Sharman facts, the absence
the first defendant having no control over the customers of real control over the use of the P2P file-
(as characterized by the Court of Appeal) and not being sharing software means that there is unlikely to
directly in business with such customers. 136 The first be any common design for the purpose of
defendant, however, had a financial interest in how suc- proving incitement of infringement.
cessful their customers were in pirating and selling the (b) An element in this action requires incitement of
infringing copies directly to end users. 137 specific persons. 144 Put another way, the
However, the Court of Appeal 138 overruled and ‘‘ inducement, incitement or persuasion to
took an extremely narrow view of ‘‘common design’’. infringe must be by a defendant to an indi-
Citing with approval Lord Templeman in Amstrad, the vidual infringer and must identifiably procure a
Court of Appeal basically required that the joint particular infringement’’. 145 This is difficult to
tortfeasors must be liable for the same infringing act so show, especially with loss of control after distri-
each commits the same tort. Here, the Court of Appeal bution.
characterized the first defendant’s primary business as This tort bears superficial resemblance to the U.S.
selling pirated computer manuals and his customer’s doctrine of inducement of infringement as expounded
business as selling pirated computer programs packaged in Grokster. Under the U.S. theory, a person who ‘‘dis-
with pirated instruction manuals. Therefore, they were tributes a device with the object of promoting its use to
different businesses and had no common design. 139 infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or
Although the Court of Appeal noted that the sale of a affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for
device used to enable copyright infringement (as in the resulting acts of infringement of third parties’’. 146
Amstrad) is very different from the supply of the
Yet the U.S. doctrine is much wider, as there is noinfringing materials themselves (as in Ong Seow Pheng
express ‘‘common design’’ requirement. Also, the defen-(Court of Appeal)), the Court ultimately did not hold
dant does not need to induce specific acts of infringe-there was sufficient similarity in the respective business
ment for liability to be found.147 A relevant factor cited isfor there to be a common design.
whether the alleged infringer showed itself to be aiming
to satisfy a known source of demand for copyright2. Incitement of Infringement infringement. 148 On the Grokster facts, Grokster was
This tort arises from a direct infringement of copy- found to have deliberately targeted the former users of
right and relates to the idea of incitement or procure- the Napster P2P file-sharing system that had been shut
ment of the direct infringement. down. This is only a factor to be considered and is not
decisive; in any case, it is very far from the specificityA divergence of opinion has emerged as to whether
required under the joint tortfeasor cause of action.this is a distinct tort from the tort of direct copyright
infringement140 or whether this is joint tortfeasor liability
based on the notion that the party inciting shares a
common design or acts in concert with the direct Conclusion: U.K. Approach Tooinfringing party. 141
Narrow and Australian ApproachEither way, this cause of action falters on the Too Wide? Sharman facts due to the following problems:
(a) If a common design is required, it would be ased on current U.K. and Singapore jurisprudence, a
difficult to show a common design between the B few results follow:
distributor of the software or similar new tech- (a) There is likely to be no authorization liability on
nology and the user because they would not be the Grokster and Sharman facts, simply because
in the same business, and the technology was there is no continuing control by the distributor.
capable of being used for both lawful or
(b) There is no joint tortfeasor or incitement ofunlawful copying. To this extent, there was no
infringement liability because there is nocontrol over the way of use of the technology by
common design and/or there is no incitementthe user. In Amstrad, 142 it was held that the
of specific persons.defendant ‘‘does not procure infringement by
While this favours the technologists and legitimateoffering for sale a machine which may be used
users of the technology and encourages innovation, thefor lawful or unlawful copying and it does not
scales are arguably unfairly tipped against copyrightprocure infringement by advertising the attrac-
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owners. This is particularly so when the above obstacles rights’’. 149 In contrast, Australia illustrates the dangers of
to liability are not premised on lack of objectionable the slippery slope in lowering the threshold conduct. 150
conduct but on lack of control as being a prerequisite Greater uncertainty and burden are placed on the tech-
(even though it may not directly relate to, or have an nologist. It is argued that past inventions (such as the
impact on, purporting to authorize or incite infringe- video recorder and tape recorders), while enabling an
ment). To avoid prejudicing the technologist and legiti- initial surge in infringements, have eventually enlarged
mate user, a higher threshold of conduct may be set, i.e., the lawful market for copyrighted works by creating
clearly blatant positive acts that contribute in a real way accessibility and awareness. 151 The resulting chill on
to infringement. technology created by the Australian position may prove
This is obviously a delicate balancing exercise. In in the long run to be detrimental to the copyright owner
Canada, recent cases show a resurgence of users’ rights so as well.
as to prevent a shift ‘‘too far in favour of the owners’
Notes:
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